EUROPEAN UNION

Addressing the rise of
Euroscepticism in Member States

Table of Contents

Letter from the Secretary-General

Dear faculty advisors, staff members, and fellow delegates,

My name is Dania Guerrero and this year I'm thrilled to be your secretary general. It is with the greatest pleasure to finally welcome you to CarMUN 2024! For more than a decade, Carmelitas Model United Nations has endeavored for the building of new ideas through the development of confidence and leadership skills, using diplomacy as a tool for the bettering of our world.

I joined CarMUN sometime around 2021 and 2022, the year after the pandemic, when everything was a fresh start for everyone, and it was not to be an exception for me. I became part of this "club" that I now call family in inspiration that my brother had before, and he also inspired me to better myself at this one thing. Today, I can objectively say that I've superseded him in this. At first, I was not really scared, but nervous of what was to come. The concept that surrounded MUN was such a positive environment that I was excited to finally see what the future was going to bring and what opportunities were to come. Being the youngest of our delegation was not easy, being the only one who didn't know a thing about the UN was even harder, nonetheless with the help of our faculties and coaches it came to be an entertaining and enriching experience where I was able to play a whole new persona. Now, after almost 3 years, I am able to say that the persona I used to play, is me! Finding myself and my path through MUN has been a blessing, and I know I'm not the only one who has done so as well.

Guided by our school's values, the secretariat is dedicated to extending our ethos globally. One where respect and diplomacy reign the dialogue between all, where the principles of the UN are followed and rightfully recognized. The lack of seriousness in today's reality reflects in every single aspect of our world, even, in MUN conferences, treating woeful issues with flippancy. That is why this year's conference theme is "Making diplomacy great again".

This year's conference aims to cultivate your skills as a delegate, encouraging you to perceive beyond mere words spoken. Regardless of your role within the conference, we aspire for every delegate, staff member, and faculty advisor to have their voice heard. Beyond fulfilling the procedural duties of the organization we emulate, our goal is to foster meaningful debate. Collaboration is key—working together to identify and achieve shared objectives paves the way for a brighter future. Every fire starts with a spark, and it begins with believing in your limitless potential.

Dania Guerrero,
Secretary General

Letters from the Directors of Committee

Dear delegates,

It is my greatest pleasure to welcome you to CarMUN 2024. My name is Daniela Rubina and will be your Co-Director for the European Union committee. CarMUN is a conference that I hold very closely to my heart. My journey in MUN started out in my last years of highschool, when I took part of Carmelitas MUN team. After graduation, I took a break from debate until last year when I joined Peruvian Debate Society (PDS), a university debate team with which in January 2024 I participated in Harvard National Model United Nations - Latin America (HNMUN-LA) and was able to achieve a Best Delegate award. Throughout this whole run in both the highschool and university circuits, one thing that has remained constant has been my participation in CarMUN. I started out as a pager, then Assistant Director, Secretary General in 2020 and, finally Director for the past 4 years. Therefore, I can guarantee you I will do everything in my power to ensure you have an incredible experience throughout these three days.

Currently, I am in my fourth year of Business Administration at Universidad del Pacífico and I can safely say that taking part in this kind of conference has been one of the most fulfilling academic experiences I have ever had. It helped me become the person I am today by giving me abilities that I use basically every single day and a broad understanding of how the world works. In this committee, we will go a lot more deep in this last point as the topic to debate will be "Addressing the rise of Euroscepticism in Member States". I encourage you all to do as much research as you can and also to make sure you understand it as this topic has many social, political and economical aspects involved.

I am very excited to meet you all in october.

Best regards,

Daniela Rubina
Director

Dear delegates,

First of all, welcome to the eleventh edition of CARMUN! My name is Adriana Arana and in this opportunity I will be your co-director of the European Union committee. I am 19 years old and an Economics student at Universidad del Pacifico. I joined CarMUN in 2019 and started the MUN journey without knowing the exact function of the United Nations; full of fears and doubts I went to my first MUN. Little did I know, this was a canonic event. Thanks to this experience, I chose my career, found my passions, and gained diverse insights. I cannot express how much I learned from all my faculty advisors and lots of nights of research. All of this made me who I am today. After being retired for two years from MUN, I joined the Peruvian Debate Society (PDS) team for Harvard National Model United Nations (HNMUN) held in Boston and now I'm willing to continue my MUN journey as a second-year delegate.

Something about me is that I am passionate about international and national affairs, especially the impact they have on economics. Also, I love learning history and how it is still impacting the present. A fun fact about me is that I am a madridista and there is a ten year gap between me and my siblings. In my spare time I enjoy watching old movies, doing nothing, indoor cycling and scrolling through twitter and TikTok.

Please remember that this committee is yours, so be bold to create the difference. I expect every delegate to participate actively, passionately and diplomatically while debating. I look forward to clear argumentation, diplomatic negotiations, notorious research and creative but feasible proposals, please take into consideration the approach and powers of our committee. Use this committee and MUN in general to develop skills, lose freight and become a vehicle of change.

In case of any doubts regarding the topic, study guide, committee procedure or anything else, do not hesitate to contact me. I'll do my very best to reply promptly.

Sincerely,
Adriana Arana
Director

1. History of the Committee

At the end of world war II in 1945, Europe was destroyed and it seeked reconstruction. However, it was done in different ways as Eastern and Western Europe had different political and economical influences. Eastern Europe was controlled by the Soviet Union, so it was done from a communist approach, while Western Europe was heavily influenced by the United State´s capitalism. It was under this later that the European Union was formed. As the Marshall Plan, a program destined to provide economic aid to eastern european countries, came into force modern industries, stronger economic markets and democracy started to appear. With this also came cooperation and integration between countries. In 1950, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman presented a plan to reconcile France and West Germany by integrating the coal and steel industries and placing them under a higher common management. At the moment of signing it in 1951, six countries total took part: West Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. The treaty was named the European Coal and Steel Community.

Due to the success of this partnership, these six countries decided in 1957 to expand their cooperation to other sectors in order to boost the development of Europe. Therefore that year they signed two new treaties, one to create the European Economic Community (EEC), to establish a common market and common policies on transport, trade and agriculture; and the other to create the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), to coordinate civilian nuclear research programs. In the following years, other countries decided to join and in 1965, all three institutions were merged for efficiency in the Merger Treaty.

In 1974, after the addition of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom, the heads of states agreed to create the European Council, where leaders would meet a minimum of 3 times a year to define guidelines for the community. In the following years, more countries would join as dictatorships around the continent started to fall. Finally in 1992,

the heads of state signed the Maastricht Treaty, which formally established the European Union.

There are three principles that determine where and to what extent the European Union can act: conferral, as the EU can only take action in areas where member states have granted it authority through the EU treaties; proportionality, as its actions cannot exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the treaties; and subsidiarity, as it can only act in areas where either the EU or national governments also can, if it can do it more effectively (European Commission, n.d.). Guided by them, the European Union has three main roles. Legislatively, it passes laws alongside the Council, decides on international agreements and enlargements, and reviews the European Commission's work programme. In its supervisory role, the Parliament oversees all EU institutions, elects the Commission President, approves how the EU budget is spent, examines citizens' petitions, and monitors the European Central Bank. Budgetarily, it works with the Council to establish and approve the EU's budget and the Multiannual Financial Framework (European Union, n.d.)

2. Introduction to the topic

To effectively address the main problem, we will begin by providing comprehensive definitions for a clear understanding of the fundamental concepts. This foundational understanding will serve as the basis for subsequent analysis.

First of all, we will start with the definition and background of Euroscepticism which refers to opposition or criticism of the European Union, in this way, also meaning to the opposition of European integration. Over time, the concept has evolved and expanded, reflecting political, economical, social and cultural concerns within member states. Furthermore, euroscepticism varies across time and space, influenced by different factors and motivations. (Leruth. B, Startin. N, Usherwood. S, 2017) Some key points to

consider in defining and understanding Euroscepticism are historical origins, the "Eurosceptic" term was originated in the UK during the mid 1980s, used by journalists and politicians to describe the conservative MPs who were skeptical regarding the European integration post-Single European Act. (Leruth. B, Startin. N, Usherwood. S, 2017) Furthermore, the multidimensional nature: Euroscepticism embodies a variety of ideologies and motivations, making it is a broad and vague term, since it can be linked to a diverse form of opposition, such as: nationalism, populism, anti globalization, etc. nevertheless, it is not defined by these. (Leruth. B, Startin. N, Usherwood. S, 2017)

Furthermore, the temporal and geographical specificity, Euroscepticism intensity and manifestations can vary significantly across different member states and historical or political periods. The focus of Eurosecoptism evolves over time, it depends on the political, economical, and social contexts. For example, the term gained prominence across Europe following key events, such as, the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the financial crises of the late 2000s. (Leruth. B, Startin. N, Usherwood. S, 2017) The impact of euroscepticism on political systems, particularly it affects political parties, public opinion and policy making within member states. Leading to the rise of political movements and parties that challenge the mainstream pro-European consensus. The translation of Eurosceptic attitudes into political actions and their impact on public policy, opinion and discourse is complex, because it can manifest in diverse forms: form policy reforms and legislative challenges to broader social and political movements. (Leruth. B, Startin. N, Usherwood. S, 2017)

Another key term to address euroscepticism is the national sovereignty, which states the supreme power within territorially defined social order, power designated to decide about its own interest and determine its own policies, administer its own affairs and lay down its own laws. Therefore, it is generally considered the chief obstacle to the growth of an international society. (Niemeyer. G, 1947) The main concern regarding Euroscepticism is the loss of nations' control over decision- making, laws, borders to EU

institutions, on that account, balancing national sovereignty with EU-wide policies and integration is a defiance of many countries.

A further concept is the economic disparities among the European Union. In order to understand it, first we need to learn the Gini coefficient that is the most commonly used measure of inequality and gives the extent to which the distribution of income within a country deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. It measures inequality on a scale from 0 to 1, where higher values indicate higher inequality, a Gini value of 100% means that only one person receives all the income in the country, while a Gini value of 0 means that income is distributed equally across the population. (Hasell, 2023)

With the following statistics, it is clear the economic disparities which exist in Europe. Inequality between member states, financial crises, and the perception that the EU benefits wealthier nations more.

In 2022, the Gini coefficient for the EU was 29.6. The highest income disparities among the EU Member States (with a Gini coefficient of at least 34.0 as shown by the darkest

Gini coefficient for equivalised disposable income per inhabitant, 2022
(Scale from 0 to 100)

EU = 29.6
- >= 37.0
- 34.0 – < 36.9
- 31.0 – < 33.9
- 28.0 – < 30.9
- 25.0 – < 27.9
- < 25.0

Switzerland, Montenegro, Serbia and Türkiye: 2021 data. Norway, North Macedonia and Albania: 2020 data. Iceland: 2018 data.
Eurostat (dataset code: ilc_di12)

Administrative boundaries: © EuroGeographics © UN–FAO © Turkstat
Cartography: Eurostat – IMAGE, 10/2023

eurostat

shade) were recorded in Bulgaria (38.4), Lithuania (36.2) and Latvia (34.3). A group of Member States, with a Gini coefficient above the EU average of 29.6 and ranging between 31.0 to 33.9, comprised Malta, Greece, Estonia, Spain, Portugal, Romania and Italy. In Croatia, Germany, Cyprus, Luxembourg and France, the Gini coefficients were close to the EU average, indicating income distributions consistent with the EU coefficient. At the other end of the scale, income was more evenly distributed in Slovakia, Slovenia, Czechia and Belgium, where the Gini coefficient was less than 25.0. (Eurostat, 2022)

Economic integration and convergence in the European Union have decelerated, raising concerts about income inequality and social exclusion over the past decade. The impact of recession has been visible in communities, but the burden hasn't been evenly distributed. If we consider the EU as one nation, income inequality among its citizens remains high. This convergence stalled due to the global crisis, maintaining high rates of inequality, especially in Central and Eastern Europe (CCE), driven by increased labor income at the top while low-income households fell behind. Even though capital income inequality contributes less to the overall, it keeps growing in high rates countries. (Inchauste, G. & Karver, J. 2015) These trends present serious challenges for shared prosperity and social cohesion through the European region.

3. Statement of the problem

Even though Euroscepticism has existed throughout the whole history of European integration, the financial crisis of 2008, the 2015 migration crisis, and the 2016 Brexit referendum have raised a new wave of anti-EU sentiment (Dutta, 2018). There are two types of Euroscepticism: 'hard' Euroscepticism, which rejects the EU and all their integration efforts, and 'soft' Euroscepticism, which opposes specific EU policies without rejecting the whole idea of integration. Both types are present in both ends of the political spectrum, from far right to far left, therefore there are many economic and cultural postures within them.

Throughout the early 2000s, support for Eurosceptic parties remained relatively low. However, following the financial crisis of 2008, the share of votes for hard Eurosceptic parties in national elections rose from below 5% to 14%. Including soft Eurosceptic parties, the combined vote share increased from around 7% to 27% by 2022 (European Commission, 2023). Eurosceptic parties commonly criticize European integration as a bureaucratic, elitist project that primarily benefits the business elite over the working class by undermining national sovereignty, identity, and increasing migration (Dutta, 2018).

The recent rise of populism across Europe has further amplified these views, with right-wing populists focusing on sovereignty and cultural issues, while left-wing populists critique the EU on socio-economic grounds. Surveys of EU citizens show a decline in trust in the EU and its institutions since a peak in 2007, with confidence consistently below 50% since then, exacerbated by the Brexit referendum in 2016 (Dutta, 2018). Since Brexit support for hard Euroscepticism has not substantially grown, potentially due to the observed consequences of it, but support for soft Euroscepticism does have.

This public sentiment reflects a belief that the existing system no longer serves their interests. There has been research done regarding the relationship between Euroscepticism and levels of development such as the European Commission´s "Geography of discontent: regional development traps lead to less support for European integration and values" published in 2023. Some findings of it are the following: hard Euroscepticism is more prominent in transitional and developed regions (15%) compared to less developed ones (9%), but when soft and hard Euroscepticism are combined, the share of votes is higher in less developed and transitional regions (34%) than in more developed areas (22%). Many people, especially older individuals and those with lower education levels, feel threatened by changes related to cultural diversity and shifting social values. Economically dynamic, diverse urban centers tend to embrace progressive ideas, while smaller towns and rural areas often lack such characteristics, exacerbating regional divides (European Commission, 2023).

The development trap is defined in the document as the incapacity to produce growth in contrast to past performance and falls behind national or EU averages. Therefore, long-term economic decline, particularly in areas struggling to adapt to globalization, trade integration, and technological transitions, has fueled discontent as residents of these areas not only perceive their economic decline but also recognize the progress of other regions.

4. Points of contention

a. Economic aspects

As mentioned before, back when it was created, the European Union had the goal of potentiating Europe's reconstruction and therefore development through the integration of European countries. As a result, when there is economic underperformance doubts about the EU effectiveness are raised.

Two of the most common conditions that lead to Euroscepticism are a: corresponding narrative, and a perception of economic change (Tranakieva & Oosterveld, 2018). The narrative of Euroscepticism shapes the debate of economic perceptions and outcomes. It influences investor confidence, affects market stability, and can alter trade and investment patterns. A strong narrative of skepticism can create uncertainty around a country's future relationship with the EU, potentially leading to market volatility and a decline in foreign direct investment. It may also impact public opinion on economic policies, driving changes in fiscal priorities and economic regulations. Additionally, the narrative can affect business strategies and consumer confidence, influencing overall economic performance and stability.

Euroscepticism often emerges in countries that either feel unfairly burdened by contributing to EU bailouts or, conversely, feel victimized by austerity measures imposed by EU institutions. For wealthier states, particularly in Northern Europe, there's a perception that they are shouldering too much of the financial weight to support struggling economies. Other countries view the EU as enforcing harsh economic policies that restrict their ability to manage domestic crises, such as unemployment and public debt.

People's perceptions of the national economy and their financial expectations are often better predictors of Euroscepticism than economic indicators like unemployment or GDP. This is because people may not always have an accurate understanding of the actual state of the economy. Research has shown that while some economic variables, such as inflation, significantly influence Eurosceptic attitudes, others, like GDP do not. This is likely because more tangible factors like inflation are easier for individuals to perceive, whereas longer-term or abstract measures like GDP are less noticeable (Tranakieva & Oosterveld, 2018). Keeping this in mind, unemployment is also taken into consideration for the perception of the economy, like the graphic below shows.

Unemployment Rate and Euroscepticism in the E.U.

Data from ILOSTAT and Eurobarometer.

■ Euroscepticism (% negative responses to image of E.U.)
■ Unemployment rate (%)

Source: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (2018)

It is worth noting that some people also believe that the support for the EU is cyclical, as, like it was shown, it is linked to the economic cycle. Therefore, it will come again when better conditions arrive.

b. <u>Social aspects</u>

The rise of Euroscepticism has had profound effects on the social sphere, especially in relation to migration. These consequences influence public attitudes, policy responses, and social cohesion. Euroscepticism often correlates with heightened hostility toward migrants, fueled by fears of losing national identity, economic competition, and cultural homogenization. Therefore, Eurosceptic movements frequently criticize the European Union (EU) migration policies, leading to a rise of xenophobia and a polarized society.

The Treaty of Lisbon enhanced the efficiency, democratic legitimacy and consistency of the European Union (EU); which aimed to address several institutional and

operational challenges that the EU faced as it expanded and integrated more deeply. It highlights the need to pool financial resources to support common policies on external borders, asylum, and immigration. (The Treaty of Lisbon, n.d)

In response to the importance of these areas, the EU established a specific heading to approach migration and border management, in the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). This qualification allocated 22.7 billion euros for the period 2021-2027, aiming to fund activities of EU agencies like: Frontex, the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), the Integrated Border Management Fund (IBMF), and the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF). Even though these allocations represent only a small percentage of the main budget, they are a significant increase compared to the previous MFF (2014-2020) and aim to address weaknesses exposed in the 2015-2016 refugee crisis. The European Parliament played a crucial role in negotiations, securing an increase in funding for border management, it is expected to reach 23.7 billion euros by 2027. Overall, with this increased budget they aim to improve the EU's capacity to answer the evolving migration and border management challenges, although it is still a relatively small percentage of the EU budget. (European Parliament Research Service, 2021)

Euroscepticism can exacerbate social divisions, with communities becoming more polarized between those who support EU migration policies and the ones who oppose them. Therefore, migration becomes a main focus of identity politics, with Eurosceptic groups often framing the issue as a struggle to preserve national identity against external influences, leading to a more fragmented society, increasing tensions between different cultural and ethnic groups. The interplay of Euroseceptic sentiments and migration policies has reached implications for the fabric of European society.

<u>Political aspects</u>

The rise of Euroscepticism has had significant effects on electoral politics, influencing elections. These effects manifest in reshaping political landscape, voter behavior, and party dynamics across the European Union.

For example, in the article "Mainstreaming Euroscepticism in European Politics," Ebru Oğurlu explores the increasing prevalence and impact of Euroscepticism in European politics since the 1990s. The paper delves into the multifaceted nature of Euroscepticism, which encompasses a range of opposition from resistance to European values and dimensions of integration to the rejection of EU membership or calls for withdrawal. Oğurlu charts the evolution of Euroscepticism from a marginal position in the 1980s to a mainstream force by the 1990s, particularly following the Maastricht Treaty. The study highlights how Euroscepticism has permeated various levels of political engagement, including political parties, public opinion, national referendums, and media narratives. Diverse Eurosceptic parties, despite their varying ideologies, have collectively challenged the process of European integration and gained significant influence and visibility, especially in the European Parliament. This rise in political power is paralleled by increasing public skepticism towards the EU, reflected in national referendums and growing hostility in public opinion. The media has played a crucial role in amplifying these Eurosceptic sentiments, further embedding them in the political discourse. The paper concludes that Euroscepticism has become an entrenched aspect of European politics, fundamentally shaping debates, policies, and the overall trajectory of the EU, posing both challenges and considerations for the future of European integration.

Mark Leonard's policy brief explores the spread and entrenchment of Euroscepticism across Europe, highlighting its evolution from a British peculiarity to a widespread continental phenomenon. He notes that Euroscepticism has modernized its arguments and broadened its appeal more effectively than pro-European movements. The euro

crisis provided Eurosceptics an opportunity to capitalize on public discontent, turning pro-European successes into arguments against the EU. Leonard identifies three main groups in British society—settlers, prospectors, and pioneers—each targeted by tailored Eurosceptic messages. Settlers are drawn by anti-immigration rhetoric, prospectors by economic arguments against the EU, and pioneers by the vision of a global, non-EU future. Leonard underscores that the EU's crisis extends beyond economics to a fundamental narrative and organizational failure, with trust in EU institutions plummeting even in core countries. This discontent reflects a deeper political void where mainstream parties have failed to represent or engage citizens effectively, leading to the rise of populist and Eurosceptic parties. These parties exploit the gap left by traditional politics, emphasizing identity and opposition rather than governance. Leonard warns that Euroscepticism's real danger lies in its influence on mainstream parties, which may harden their stances or retreat into technocratic solutions. To counter this, he advocates for more imaginative policies on migration, growth, and self-government, urging mainstream parties to engage in political battles that address the root causes of Eurosceptic discontent.

5. Case Studies

a. <u>United Kingdom - Brexit</u>

One of the most prominent examples of Euroscepticism influencing electoral outcomes is the Brexit referendum, where Eurosceptic campaigning led to the United Kingdom's decisions to leave the European Union (EU).

In the referendum held on June 23, 2016, 52% of British voters opted to leave the EU. Leading to a process of more than two years of separation and negotiations after Britain's formal submission of the request to leave in March 2017. The withdrawal agreement has been in force since February 1, 2020, regulating an orderly exit of this country from the EU and maintaining application of the community acquis in its relations until December 31, 2020. From there, the relationship between the UK and the EU is based on the "Trade and Cooperation Agreement" which represents a significant change for citizens, companies, and administrations of the UK and EU.

Migration was key for the Brexit campaign. "Take back control" was a popular slogan which promised to take back the reins of the country that, according to the pro-Brexit, lived under the yoke of Brussels. Therefore, being able to control immigration policies was one of the main reasons for Brexit's support. Nevertheless, the UK has experienced the largest population increase since the 1960s, migration flows from the EU have plummeted, despite that, more people have arrived from other countries. On account of the British government equalizing immigration rules for EU and non-EU citizens, it liberalized the rules for the latter. Hence, immigration from the EU has fallen and immigration from outside the EU has risen sharply, which is probably not what voters had in mind. (Curtice, 2022)

Euroscepticism and the pro-Brexit thoughts are linked through the belief that further exits from the EU are necessary, whereas for Europhiles, the connection is less pronounced but still present. Highlighting two gaps affecting our understanding of the EU public opinion. First, there is a disparity between Eurosceptic political elites, who softened their exit stances, and the supporters who have the belief for more countries to leave. Second, there is a gap between Europhiles' opposition to Brexit and their doubts regarding the EU's stability. In this way, following the Brexit vote, Eurosceptic leaders across Europe praised the UK's decision. Nationalist parties in France, the Netherlands, Slovakia, and Greece even called for similar referendums in their own countries.(Ganderson, 2023) Therefore, Euroscepticism in the member states is likely to depend on the series of future crises the EU would face and the future success between the UK-EU relations. (Kaplan, 2023)

b. <u>Greece</u>

Mainstream parties such as New Democracy (ND) and PASOK largely supported EU membership, seeing it as vital for Greece's economic recovery and political stability. They argued that continued participation in the EU and adherence to its economic reforms would eventually bring benefits, even as the Greek public struggled with the immediate impacts of austerity. (Vasilopoulou, S. 2018)

On the other hand, more radical and Eurosceptic parties, particularly SYRIZA, capitalized on the public's growing discontent with EU-imposed austerity measures. SYRIZA, in particular, criticized the EU's role in exacerbating Greece's economic crisis, blaming the EU for its lack of flexibility and prioritization of financial markets over social welfare. (Vasilopoulou, S. 2018) The party advocated for policies that would reassert national control over Greece's economy and reject further austerity.

These diverging views were not static but evolved over time as the crisis continued. Initially, SYRIZA's anti-EU stance was very strong, but as the party neared government

power, its position softened, highlighting the pragmatic need to balance Eurosceptic rhetoric with the realities of governance. (Vasilopoulou, S. 2018)

Similarly, mainstream parties, while remaining largely pro-EU, also had to adjust their messaging to acknowledge the significant challenges their EU-aligned policies were causing domestically.

Overall, party competition, public opinion, and crisis politics intersected with attitudes towards the EU. The Greek case confirmed assumptions that mainstream parties would maintain their pro-EU agendas. Nevertheless, not all challenger parties put forward Eurosceptic positions. This case sheds light on the complexity of Euroscepticism in Greece, showing that parties used the issue strategically, shifting their stances based on changing political and economic circumstances.

c. <u>Italy</u>

After their defeat in the Second World War, the Italian political system was divided between the Christian Democrats (DC) and the Italian Communist Party (PCI). One of their main differing viewpoints was regarding foreign policy and the European Union. The PCI saw the EU as a loss of national sovereignty, the common market meant for them less exports, less industrial production and giving power up to the large private industries; therefore, a tool for U.S. influence in Western Europe. The DC on the other hand, saw this integration as an opportunity to not only to rebuild Italy's economic system, but also to reintegrate Italy into the influential spheres of international politics, allowing it to escape the "marginal group" it had fallen into after the war.

This was a dividing issue until the decade of 1970, when Enrico Berlinguer, leader of the PCI, moderated the party´s radical vision on the EU integration and adopted the Eurocommunism, an emerging political movement that advocated for more independent and democratic path to socialism that was compatible with the political systems of Western Europe. During the following couple of decades, Italy had one of the highest percentages of citizens who believed that Italian membership of the EU was a good thing (Brunazzo & Mascitelli, 2020). However, after the end of the so-called First Republic, a new party system appeared that had inverted the roles. Now, it was the center-left, the more committed one to the integration of Europe and the possibility of progress through it.

As this is the system configuration that remains to this day, it shows that euroscepticism has always been present in Italy, nonetheless it is important to recognize there was a breaking point in 2008 with the world economic crisis. During the decades before, the EU had been calling on Italy to reform its economy, abolish small and large monopolies, open service and product markets, liberalize regulated professions, reduce taxes, improve the judicial system and promote good public administration (Romano, 2018). It is in the course of this adaptation process that the financial crisis arrived, and as it did in other countries, it produced slow economic growth, high unemployment rates and

public debt. Therefore, the EU issued economic measures for members to follow to counterattack the crisis, but given that they kept altering the country's economic and social order, Italians saw them as a risk of losing acquired rights and long-standing benefits (Romano, 2018). Since then, support for EU integration has become more and more volatile. Even within the government, they have put up resistance to certain topics, seeking exemptions from the rules. The most recent biggest demonstration of the rising of euroscepticism sentiment came in 2018 when the Five Star Movement won the elections.

6. Questions A Resolution Must Answer (QARMAs)

1) How can the EU better respect and protect national sovereignty while promoting integration?

2) What economic disparities between Member States are contributing to Euroscepticism?

3) What role do economic grievances play in fueling political Euroscepticism, and how can they be addressed together?

4) How can the EU ensure that economic integration does not exacerbate political tensions within Member States?

5) How can the EU address concerns about austerity measures and their impact on Euroscepticism?

6) How can the EU improve communication and engagement with citizens to reduce Euroscepticism?

7. <u>Final Remarks</u>

- Emphasize diplomatic actions, good research and ***<u>argumentation.</u>***

8. <u>Position Papers</u>

For this year's edition, CarMUN will have position papers. This document, standard in Model UN preparation, allows delegates to research the policy of their country (or character), while putting their writing skills in practice. It should mention previous actions towards the committee date, and propose solutions.

Delegates should send their position papers via the Committee's email: european_union@carmelitas.edu.pe

When sending the document, delegates must indicate their name, school (or delegation), and the country they're representing. It should be attached as a **Word file**. Furthermore, all documents must be written in **Times New Roman 11, single interspace, and standard margins.**

The deadline for sending position papers is **October 11th until 11:59 p.m**. Punctuality will be part of the evaluation.

a. Structure of the Position Papers:

Header: It should include the name of the committee, topic, delegate, and school. Next to this information, there should be images of the coat of arms and flag of the country to be represented.

First Paragraph: This paragraph should serve as an introduction to the topic, as well as your country's policy. Usually, this is the shortest paragraph on a position paper, so delegates need to summarize their ideas. The beginning and end of the paragraph must provoke interest in the reader. To do so, you can use a quote, question, or storytelling, among others.

Second paragraph: This paragraph comprehends your country's relations to the topic and committee, through past actions on the matter. It is a substantive paragraph, as delegates will mention what they have discovered during their research such as legislations, and resolutions, among others. The aforementioned does not mean that this paragraph should consist only of copy-paste, on the contrary, the country's opinion should always be present. Take into account this is the largest paragraph of a position paper.

Third paragraph: This paragraph gives a purpose to the position paper, as it focuses on proposals. Delegates will be able to create solutions to the committee's topic, taking into consideration their country's policy. Also, there should be a strong closing sentence, since this is the last paragraph of the document.

Sources: On a second sheet delegates must cite all resources used in the preparation of the document, in APA 7 format. If a source is omitted, it will be considered plagiarism and will be sanctioned by the chair. It is recommended to read official, primary sources, such as the websites of international organizations, governments, or the United Nations itself.

9. **Bibliography**

Areas of EU action. (n.d.). European Commission. https://commission.europa.eu/about-european-commission/role-european-commission/law/areas-eu-action_en

Brotman, A. (2022, September 27). *Giorgia Meloni and the new face of euroscepticism*. Geopolitical Monitor. https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/giorgia-meloni-and-the-new-face-of-euroscepticism/

Brunazzo, M., & Mascitelli, B. (2020). *At the origin of Italian Euroscepticism*. Australian and New Zealand Journal of European Studies. https://esaanz.org.au/anzjes/

De Santa Olalla Saludes, P. M., De Santa Olalla Saludes, P. M., & De Santa Olalla Saludes, P. M. (2024, April 5). Prime Minister Meloni, from Euroscepticism to Europeanism in just a year and a half of government. *Atalayar*. https://www.atalayar.com/en/opinion/pablo-martin-santa-olalla-saludes/prime-minister-meloni-from-euroscepticism-to-europeanism-in-just-year-and-half-of-governme/2024040506000198407.html

European Parliament – roles and powers | European Union. (n.d.). European Union. https://european-union.europa.eu/institutions-law-budget/institutions-and-bodies/search-all-eu-institutions-and-bodies/european-parliament_en

Farman, D. (2018, January 5). The underrated complexity of Euroscepticism and why it matters. *The New Federalist*. https://www.thenewfederalist.eu/the-underrated-complexity-of-euroscepticism-and-why-it-matters?lang=fr

Geography of discontent: Regional development traps lead to less support for European integration and values. (2023). In *European Commission*. https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/whats-new/newsroom/06-12-2023-geography-of-discontent-regional-development-traps-lead-to-less-support-for-european-integration-and-values_en

History of the European Union – 1945-59 | European Union. (n.d.). European Union. https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/history-eu/1945-59_en

Icwa. (n.d.). *Rising euroscepticism in Europe: An assessment - Indian Council of World Affairs (Government of India)*. https://www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=2495&lid=1872

ITALY'S EUROSCEPTICISM a CASE OF VICTIMHOOD AND a TALE OF MISSED OPPORTUNITY. (2018). Institut Jacques Delors. https://institutdelors.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/ItalysEuroscepticism-Romano-March18-1-1.pdf

Joe Hasell (2023) - "Measuring inequality: what is the Gini coefficient?" OurWorldInData.org. Retrieved from: https://ourworldindata.org/what-is-the-gini-coefficient
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Living_conditions_in_Europe_-_income_distribution_and_income_inequality&oldid=528159#

Niemeyer, G. (1947). National Sovereignty and Individual Behavior. *The Journal Of Politics*, 9(3), 417-428. https://doi.org/10.2307/2125798

Ogurlu, E. (2019) Mainstreaming euroscepticism in European politics. EASTERN JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN STUDIES Volume 10, Issue 2. Retrieved from: https://ejes.uaic.ro/articles/EJES2019_1002_OGU.pdf

Orlando, V., & Conrad, M. (2024). Reinforcing or moderating? The impact of Brexit on Italian and German Euroscepticism. *Frontiers in Political Science*, 6. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2024.1063039

The development trap: a cause of Euroscepticism? (2023). European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/whats-new/panorama/2023/09/09-06-2023-the-development-trap-a-cause-of-euroscepticism_en

The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. (1998, July 20). *Eurocommunism | Marxism, socialism, communism*. Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Eurocommunism

The rise of Euroscepticism and how to deal with it in the EU. (2014, September). Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/186851/NUPI%20Policy%20Brief-9-14-Leonard.pdf

Tranakieva, K., & Oosterveld, W. (2018, September). *Pricy perceptions: Can the economy predict euroscepticism?* The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies. https://hcss.nl/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Pricy-Perceptions-Can-the-Economy-Predict-Euroscepticism.pdf

Weyns, J., & Bursens, P. (2022). Is euroscepticism contagious? *Politics of the Low Countries*, *4*(1), 3–26. https://doi.org/10.5553/plc/.000011

What is Euroscepticism? (n.d.). Eavi. https://eavi.eu/what-is-euroscepticism/

Zappettini, F. and Maccaferri, M. (2021). 'Euroscepticism between Populism and Technocracy: The Case of Italian Lega and Movimento 5 Stelle' in, Journal of Contemporary European Research 17 (2): 239-257.

Inchauste, G. & Karver, J. 2015 "Understanding Changes in Inequality in the EU Background to "Growing United: Upgrading Europe's Convergence Machine" World Bank on the European Union. https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/319381520461242480-0080022018/original/EUIGReportUnderstandingchangesinInequality.pdf

European Parliament Research Service (2021) "Migration and Border Management. Heading 4 of the 2021-2027 MFF" https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/690544/EPRS_BRI(2021)690544_EN.pdf

Vasilopoulou, S. (2018). The party politics of Euroscepticism in times of crisis: The case of Greece. *Politics*, *38*(3), 311-326. https://doi.org/10.1177/0263395718770599

The Treaty of Lisbon | Fact Sheets on the European Union | European Parliament. (s. f.). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/5/the-treaty-of-lisbon#:~:text=The%20Treaty%20of%20Lisbon%20formally,Council%20has%20no%20legislative%20functions

Ganderson, J. (2023). Exiting after Brexit: public perceptions of future European Union member state departures. *West European Politics*, *47*(5), 1199–1222. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2022.2164135

Kaplan, Z. (2023). Brexit Dilemma and the Future of Euroscepticism. *İktisadi İdari Ve Siyasal Araştırmalar Dergisi*, *8*(21), 618-629. https://doi.org/10.25204/iktisad.1230211

Rosas, P. (2024, 2 julio). *Elecciones en Reino Unido: 4 formas en las que el país cambió con el Brexit (el tema del que no se ha hablado en la campaña electoral)*. BBC News Mundo. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/crgrlqvx8n7o